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CHAPTER 14 
Torts 
CLYDE D. BERGSTRESSER" 
§14.1. Introduction. The Survey period witnessed significant de-
velopments in many areas of tort law. Among these developments were 
several Supreme Judicial Court decisions giving further interpretation 
to the scope and application of the medical malpractice tribunal system, 
extending its jurisdiotion to complaints against providers under the Con-
sumer Protection Act,! and to actions for breach of warranty against 
physicians.2 In the area of products liability, the Court also established 
standards clarifying the duty of manufacturers to design safe products.3 
A tort remedy was created for the negligent infliction of emotiona:1 
distress resulting in physical injuries to parents who witness injuries to 
their children.4 The Court also provided clarification for the elements 
of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.5 In the area 
of landlord-tenant relations, the Supreme Judicial Court recognized the 
landlord's implied warranty of habitability as the basis for an action in 
tort for damages to a tenant who sustained a personal injury resulting 
from a landlord's failure to maintain his premises in accordance with 
applicable safety codes.6 In addition, the General Court enacted legiS-
lation clarifying the duties and obligations of ski area operators 7 and 
" CLYDE D. BERGSTRESSER is a partner in the firm of Stahlin & Berg-
stresser, Inc., Boston. Acknowledgment is given for the generous assistance of 
Jeremy A. Stahlin, Morris S. Shubow, Brook K. Baker, Elizabeth A. Rogers, Ronna 
Howard, and Mary Squiers. 
§14.1. 1 Little v. Rosenthal, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2793, 382 N.E.2d 1037. See 
§ 10 infra. 
2 Salem Orthopedic Surgeons, Inc. v. Quinn, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 661, 386 
N.E.2d 68. See § 10 infra. 
3 Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3168, 384 N.E.2d 1188; 
Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 378 N.E.2d 964 (1968); Smith v. Ariens, 375 
Mass. 620, 377 N.E.2d 954 (1978). See § 3 infra. 
4 Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978). See § 9 
infra. 
5 Harrison v. Loyal Proteotive Life Ins. Co., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2477, 396 
N.E.2d 987; Boyle v. Wenk, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1947, 392 N.E.2d 1053. See 
§ 9 infra. 
6 Crowell v. McCaffrey, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 568, 386 N.E.2d 1256. See § 8 
infra. 
7 G.L. c. 143, §§ 7lN-71S, as enacted by Acts of 1978, c. 455, § 4. See 11 
infra. 
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legislation permitting family members to obtain compensatory damages 
from other family members who have caused or threatened them with 
physical harm.s 
§14.2. Products Liability-Strict Liability. In the two products li-
ability eases decided during the Survey year, Swartz v. General Motors 
Corp.! and the companion case of Back v. Wickes Corp.,2 the Supreme 
Judicial Court again 3 addressed the issue of whether to adopt the doc-
trine of strict liability in tort in products liability cases.4 Because it 
found that the commonwealth's expanded warranty law offered litigants 
a comparable remedy,5 the Court refused to adopt the doctrine of strict 
liability as embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.6 
Both Swartz and Back were products liability cases predicated on the 
defective design of motor vehicles.7 In Swartz the trial judge, at the 
conclusion of the plaintiffs' opening statement, directed a verdict for the 
defendant on the issue of strict liability.s On appeal, the Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed, thereby declining to adopt strict liability as a 
theory of recovery in the commonwealth. It did so, however, noting 
that legislative changes in the commonwealth's warranty law 9 rendered 
such a move unnecessary.10 The Court, reviewing a series of amend-
ments to seotion 2-318 of chapter 106 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
noted that the requirement of privity of contract, a traditional defense 
S C.L. c. 209A, as enacted by Acts of 19,78, c. 447, § 2. See § 12 infra. 
§14.2. 1 1978 Mass. Ad. Sh. 1867, 378 N.E.2d 61. 
2 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1874, 378 N.E.2d 964. 
3 See Necktas v. Ceneral Motors Corp., 357 Mass. 546, 259 N.E.2d 234 
(1970), where a majority of the Court rejected the adoption of strict liability in 
tort. Id. at 549, 259 N.E.2d at 236. 
4 For a list of jurisdictions which have adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 402A (1965) or a modified version, see 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A(3) (1978). 
5 C.L. c. 106, § 2-318, as amended by Acts of 1971, c. 670, § 1; Acts of 1973, 
c. 750, § 1; Acts of 1974, c. 153. 
6 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1868-71, 378 N.E.2d at 64; 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1881-82, 378 N.E.2d at 969. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A 
( 1965), which provides in relevant part that a business seller of a defective product 
will be. liable to a user or consumer for physical harm resulting from the use of 
the product even though "( a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the 
preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought 
the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller." Ia. 
7 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1867, 378 N.E.2d at 62; 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1875, 378 N.E.2d at 966. Both cases, which were decided in the same day, 
reached the same result with respect to the issue of strict liability. Therefore, the 
remaining discussion will make reference to the Swartz decision only. 
s 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1868, 378 N.E.2d at 63. 
9 C.L. c. 106, § 2-318. 
10 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1870, 378 N.E.2d at 63. 
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to allegations of breach of warranty, had been abolished,u Therefore, 
the Court reasoned, the resulting statute provided a remedy as compre-
hensive as that advocated by the Restatement.12 On this basis, the 
Court held that in the commonwealth there is no "strict liability in tort" 
apart from liability for breach of warranty imposed under chapter 106, 
section 2-318.13 
Despite the basic soundness of the Court's conclusion concerning the 
congruence of the two theories of liability, there remain some differences 
which should be noted. Semantic differences, although minimal, are 
apparent. First, strict liability in tort applies to cases involving defective 
products placed on the market by a "seller . . . engaged in the business 
of selling such a product." 14 The Uniform Commercial Code employs 
the term "merchant," which it defines as a "person who deals in 
goods .... " 1" Second, recovery in strict tort liability has been extended 
to "consumers or users, remote purchasers, employees, and bystanders," 16 
even though section 402A of the Restatement restricts recovery to con-
sumers or users.17 Under section 2-318 in Massachusetts, "any person 
whom the manufacturer, seller, lessor, or supplier might reasonably have 
expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods" 18 can maintain 
a claim alleging breach of warranty. Third, under either theory, in 
order for the injured plaintiff to recover, the product must have been 
defective or unsafe when the manufacturer relinquished his control,19 
and the injury must have been reasonably foreseeable, wheth~r growing 
out of normal use Or foreseeable misuse.2o Section 402A of the Restate-
11 [d. at 1869, 378 N.E.2d at 63. See Acts of 1971, c. 670, § 1; Acts of 1973, 
c. 750, § I; Acts of 1974, c. 153. As amended, C.L. c. 106, § 2-318 reads: 
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any 
action brought against the manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier of goods to 
recover damages for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, 
although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from the defendant if the 
plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier might 
reasonably have. expected to use, oonsume or be affeoted by the goods. The 
manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier may not exclude or limit the operation 
of this section. Failure to give notice shall not bar recovery under this section 
unless the defendant proves that he was prejudiced thereby. All actions under 
this section shall be commenced within three years next after the date the injury 
and damage occurs. 
[d. 
12 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1869-70, 378 N.E.2d at 63. 
13 [d. at 1867, 378 N.E.2d at 62. 
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(a) (1965). 
15 C.L. c. 106, § 2-104(1). 
16 Note, Massachusetts Strict Product Liability Law, 14 NEW ENG. L. REv. 
237, 251 (1978). 
17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965). 
18 C.L. c. 106, § 2-318. 
19 See, e.g., Coyne v. Tilley Co., 368 Mass. 230, 318 N.E.2d 623 (1975). 
20 See, e.g., Back v. Wickes Corp., 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1874, 378 N.E.2d 964. 
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ment, however, requires a defective condition that is unreasonably 
dangerous,21 while the Uniform Commercial Code states that a good is 
unmerchantable if it is unfit "for the ordinary purposes for which such 
goods are used .... " 22 
In addition to differences with respect to terminology, there are other 
more substantive distinctions between strict tort liability and Massachu-
setts' statutory warranty liability, distinotions which operate as limita-
tions on recovery. The 1973 legislative amendment to section 2-318 
regarding notice of breach provides a limited defense to warranty actions 
where the defendant can prove prejudice resulting from the lack of 
notice.23 This provision has no counterpart in section 402A of the Re-
statement.24 While legislative retention of this limitation might be 
laudable where the defendant manufacturer is in fact prejudiced by 
the failure to notice a claim, it nevertheless does constitute a limitation 
not contained in the Restatement. A second limitation contained in 
Uniform Commercial Code concerns the un enforceability of disclaimers 
of express and implied warranties involving consumer goods and serv-
ices and the un enforceability of attempted contractual limitations on 
the same.25 At present, this provision does not apply to nonconsumer 
goods, such as heavy industrial or commercial equipment. Accordingly, 
a significant class of foreseeable innocent users, particularly employees, 
may still be barred from warranty recovery by the arms-length bargain-
ing of employers-purchasers and manufacturers. 
The impact of these differences-some semantic some substantive-
remains to be seen. Clearly, the Supreme judicial Court has chosen 
warranty as the appropriate remedy for claims arising out of consumer 
use of manufactured products. It remains for future cases and legisla-
tive enactments to determine where the road of warranty liability will 
lead. 
§14.3. Products Liability-Duty to Design a Safe Product. The duty 
of a manufacturer to design a product so that it is reasonably fit for its 
intended use is well-established in Massachusetts.1 This duty has been 
recognized to include instances where an improper design feature pre-
vented a safety mechanism from operating as intended.2 During the 
Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court substantially broadened the 
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) . 
22 C.L. c. 106, § 2-314(2)(c). 
23 Acts of 1973, c. 750, § 1. 
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. 
25 C.L. c. 106, § 2-316A. 
§14.3. 1 See, e.g., do Canto v. Ametek, Inc., 367 Mass. 776, 328 N.E.2d 873 
( 1975). 
2 Id. 
4
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duty to design a safe product in three separate cases, Uloth v. City Tank 
Corp.,3 Smith v. Ariens CO.,4 and Back v. Wickes Corp.5 
Ordinarily, if a product performs the functions for which it was de-
signed and manufactured, the manufacturer or designer has no liability, 
especially where the inherent dangers of the product are obvious to the 
predictable users or where adequate warnings of risks have been fur-
nished.6 The decision in Uloth v. City Tank Corp.7 created an exception 
to this rule where inexpensive safety designs could substantially reduce 
the risk of harm with minimal impact on product function. In Uloth, 
the plaintiff, an unskilled and uneducated worker, lost his foot when it 
got caught by a descending trash compacter blade at the back of a 
refuse truck on which he was working. When the compacting cycle 
began to run, the plaintiff thought the truck was beginning to move 
and quickly leaped onto the rear step. In the process he lost his balance 
and his left foot was trapped and severed by the descending blade.8 
At trial, the judge denied the defendants' motions for directed verdicts.9 
On direct appeal from the denial of motions for directed verdicts, the 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed judgment on the negligence counts,10 
At the outset of its analysis, the Court stated that the focus in design 
negligence cases should not be on how the product is meant to function 
but "on whether the product is designed with reasonable care to elimi-
nate avoidable dangers." 11 The Court rejeoted the suggestion that the 
issue of negligence should tum solely on whether the product or its 
safety features performed their intended functions.12 It observed that 
a product may function as intended and still be negligently designed. 
The Court ruled that where, as in the present case, the plaintiff had 
presented evidence of design changes which would have lessened the 
danger of the product without undue cost or significant diminution in 
the efficiency of the product, the case should be presented to the jury,13 
Thus, by focusing on the facility with which the manufacturer could 
incorporate safety mechanisms into his product, the Court adopted a 
rule that would encourage manufacturers to design safe, if imperfect, 
products rather than unsafe perfect ones.14 
3 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3168, 384 N.E.2d 1188. 
4 375 Mass. 620, 377 N.E.2d 954 (1978). 
5 375 Mass. 633, 378 N.E.2d 964 (1978). 
6 Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp., 372 Mass. 171,360 N.E.2d 1062 (1977). 
7 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3168, 384 N.E.2d 1188. 
8 ld. at 3171, 384 N.E.2d at 1190-91. 
9 ld. at 3168, 384 N.E.2d at 1190. 
10 ld. at 3169, 384 N.E.2d at 1190. 
n ld. at 3172, 384 N.E.2d at 1191. 
12 ld. 
13 ld. at 3176, 384 N.E.2d at 1193. 
14 ld. at 3172-73, 384 N.E.2d at 1191. 
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In reaching its decision, the Court also rejected the defendants' sug-
gestion that warnings alone or the presence of obvious danger could 
limit a manufacturer's liability.15 It recognized, however, that the ex-
istence of warnings or obvious danger is a factor to be weighed by the 
jury on the issue of negligence.1o The Court noted that in certain cir-
cumstances a warning might not reduce the likelihood of injury. 
[A] user may not have a real alternative to using a dangerous 
product . . .. Further, a warning is not effective in eliminating 
injuries due to instinctual reactions, momentary inadvertence, or 
forgetfulness on the part of the worker. One of the primary pur-
poses of safety devices is to guard against such forseeable situa-
tions,17 
The Court therefore ruled, in view of the somewhat limited effectiveness 
of warnings, that if a slight change in design could prevent serious in-
juries, the designer of a product could not avoid liability simply by 
warning of the possible injury.IS 
The duty to design products to minimize foreseeable risks was further 
refined in Smith v. Ariens CO.!9 In Smith, the plaintiff was injured 
while operating a snowmobile manufactured by the defendant. The 
snowmobile hit a rock partially covered by snow. On impact, the plain-
tiff's face struck a brake bracket which had two sharp metal protrusions 
which were pOinted toward her face. As a result of the accident, the 
plaintiff reqUired surgery.20 The trial court entered a directed verdict 
for the manufacturer and the Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme 
Judicial Court reversed and ordered a new triaJ.21 
On appeal, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that "tort 
liability should not be imposed on manufacturers for design defects 
which merely enhance, rather than cause, injuries." 22 Observing, how-
ever, that a manufacturer has the duty to design products that are rea-
sonably fit for their intended use, the Court reasoned that liability could 
be found if collisions were viewed as incidental to the normal use of 
the products. 23 Recognizing two divergent lines of cases concerning the 
extent of liability,24 the Supreme JudiCial Court embraced the more 
15 ld. at 3173-74, 384 N.E.2d at 1191. 
16 ld. at 3176, 384 N.E.2d at 1193. 
17 ld. at 3174, 384 N.E.2d at 1192. 
18 ld. at 3175, 384 N.E.2d at 1192. 
19 375 Mass. 620, 377 N.E.2d 954 (1978). 
20 ld. at 621, 377 N.E.2d at 955. 
21 ld. 
22 ld. at 623, 377 N.E.2d at 956. 
23 ld. 
24 ld. at 623-24, 377 N.E.2d at 956-57. Compare Evans v. General Motors 
Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966) (no 
6
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progressive view that collisions are foreseeable as incidental to the use 
of certain products. 2; The Court found that it was foreseeable that 
snowmobiles, like automobiles, would be involved in collisions. Thus, 
it determined that the defendant owed a duty to users of its snowmobiles 
to avoid unreasonable risks of injuries resulting from collisions.26 On 
this basis, the Court held that liability may be imposed for an enhanced 
injury when that injury results from the manufacturer's failure to use 
reasonable care in the design of its product.27 
In Back v. Wickes Corp.,28 the Court applied the rule expressed in 
Smith to a products liability action brought under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. 2!l The action was brought by the representatives of crash 
victims who were killed when their motor home had caught fire and 
exploded after hitting a cable fence at the side of the highway. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the motor home was defective both because of 
the location and design of the gas tank and because of the flammability 
of the motor home itself. 30 After jury verdicts for the defendants, the 
plaintiffs appealed, in part because of certain jury instructions. The 
Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment for defendants and or-
dered a new trial.31 
On appeal, the Court ruled that, under the circumstances of the case, 
the trial judge was in error to instruct the jury that misuse or abuse 
of a product would be a complete defense.32 In so ruling, the Court, 
by way of dicta, remarked that the jury instructions were incomplete 
because they permitted the jury to conclude that crashing into a guard-
rail is an abnormal use of a motor home, such as would relieve the 
liability for enhanced injuries because intended use of products does not include 
participation in collisions with other objects) with Larson v. Genexal Motors Corp., 
391 F.2d 495, 501 (8th Cir. 1968) (finding that enhanced injuries from collisions 
are foreseeably incidental to normal use). 
25 375 Mass. at 624, 377 N.E.2d at 957. 
26 ld. at 625, 377 N.E.2d at 957. 
27 ld. In reaching its decision the Court disposed of two other arguments which 
are significant in products liability litigation. First, the Court held that the presence 
of a decal containing the name "Ariens" was sufficient to identify the defendant as 
the manufacturer, particularly since "Ariens" was defendant's trademark. ld. at 
1858-60, 377 N.E.2d at 955-56. Second, the Court ruled that expert testimony 
was not required to establish that a design defect exposed the users to an unreason-
able, risk of injury. In this instance, the jury could determine from its own lay 
knowledge whether an unshielded metal protrusion was such a defect. ld. at 1863, 
377 N.E.2d at 957-58. 
28 375 Mass. 633, 378 N.E.2d 946 (1978). 
29 For a discussion of this aspect of the case, see § 2 supra. 
30 ld. at 636-37, 378 N.E.2d at 967. 
31 ld. at 635, 378 N.E.2d at 966. 
32 ld. at 638, 378 N.E.2d at 968. The Court ruled that since no evidence was 
presented that the product was misused, the instruction on misuse was superfluous 
and misleading. ld. 
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manufacturer of liability.3a Citing Smith v. Ariem CO.,34 the Court 
pointed out that, with regard to negligence actions, it had rejected the 
view that a c'Ollision was not foreseeably incidental to the use of a motor 
vehicle.35 It then likewise rejected the applicability of this view to 
products liability actions brought under the Uniform Commercial Code.36 
Applying this rule, the Court reasoned that crashing into a highway 
guardrail was not necessarily an "abnormal" or "extraordinary" use 'Of a 
motor homeY The Court thereby made it clear that in future products 
liability cases collision will be deemed to be among the foreseeable uses 
of a motor vehicle. 
These three Supreme Judicial Court decisions articulate in two respects 
an expanded duty to design a safe product: (1) a manufacturer must 
incorporate reasonable safety features into the product, and (2) the 
manufacturer must design a product to minimize injuries caused by 
mishaps arising out of the ordinary use of the product. With regard to 
the first requirement, the manufacturer may be liable even if its product 
performed as intended, when there is evidence that an available design 
modification would have substantially reduced or eliminated the risk 
of injury without adding undue cost or interfering with the performance 
of the product.38 In the case of the second requirement, the manufac-
turer may breach his duty if he fails to design the product so as to avoid 
or minimize risks from all reasonably foreseeable events, including ao-
cidents 3n or collisions.40 This expanded duty of manufacturers to pro-
duce safe products is a progressive step in Massachusetts products li-
ability law. By grounding liability on the foreseeability of the resultant 
harm, the Court has drawn on one touchstone of both tort and warranty 
law. Insofar as the manufacturer is best situated to design and test a 
product for safety and to spread the costs of any resultant safety im-
provements, inc-reased responsibility, fostered by increased liability, 
furthers the public interest.H By imposing increased liability, the Court 
has prOvided the economic incentive to insure the incorporation of safety 
devices that will safeguard the users of these products. 
§14.4. Products Liability-Admissibility 'Of Recall Letter. A recur-
ring evidentiary prDblem in the law 'Of torts has been the admissibility 
'Of evidence of subsequent improvements Dr repairs when offered to 
33 rd. at 638-39, 378 N.E.2d at 968. 
34 375 Mass. 620, 377 N.E.2d 954 (1978). 
35 375 Mass. at 639, 378 N.E.2d at 968. 
36 rd. 
37 rd. 
38 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3176, 384 N.E.2d at 1193. 
39 375 Mass. at 624, 377 N.E.2d at 957. 
40 375 Mass. at 639, 378 N.E.2d at 968. 
41 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. ,at 3175, 384 N.E.2d at 1192, and cases cited. 
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establish a defendant's liability for damages occurring prior to the im-
provements or repairs. 1 A specific example of this problem, arising in 
actions based on products liability, is the question of recall letters or 
recall campaigns offered by a plaintiff on the issues of defectiveness or 
conrrol,2 In order to recover damages caused by an alleged improperly 
manufactured or defectively designed product, a plaintiff must show 
that a defect existed before the manufacturer introduced the product 
into the stream of commerce.3 Where the plaintiff's theory is founded 
on improper manufacture, tracing the defect to the manufacturer is 
particularly difficult because the defendant may argue that the shipper, 
the retailer, or normal wear and tear is responSible for an alleged defect. 
In Carey v. General Motors Corp.,4 the Supreme Judicial Court consid-
ered, inter alia, whether a recall letter, warning of the same defect 
alleged by the plaintiff as the cause of his injuries,5 should be admitted 
to prove that the plaintiff's motor vehicle was defective when it left the 
manufacturer. 6 
In Carey, the plaintiff's one-year-oldautomobile, manufactured by 
General Motors, left the roadway and hit a tree, thereby causing severe 
injuries to both plaintiffs. 7 The plaintiff-driver testified that he at-
tempted to down-shift the vehicle's manual transmission approximately 
500 feet from the point of the accident.8 At 400 feet from the point 
of collision, the plaintiff noticed that the accelerator pedal had become 
stuck.9 While he attempted to free the pedal, the automobile accelerated 
§14.4. 1 See, e.g., Dias v. Woodrow, 342 Mass. 218, 172 N.E.2d 705 (1961) 
(evidence of repairs after accident insufficient to show control); Manohester v. 
City of Attleboro, 288 Mass. 492, 193 N.E. 4 (1934) (safety measures taken 
after accident inadmissible); but see doCanto v. Ametek, 367 Mass. 776, 328 N.E.2d 
873 (1975) (post-accident safety improvements admissible to prove knowledge or 
notice as to defect and to show practicality of improvements); see generally 19 
MASSACHUSETIS PRACTICE, K. HUGHES, EVIDENCE § 293-94, at 346-52 (1961); C. 
MCCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 275, at 666-69 (2d ed. 1972). 
2 See, e.g., Manieri v. Volkswagenwerk, 151 N.J. Super. 422, 376 A.2d 1317 
(App. Div. 1977) (recall letters admissible if pertaining to defect testified to by 
plaintiff's expert); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 57 (Okla. 
1976) (defect must be proved independently; recall letters relevant only to issue 
of existence of defect while product under manufaoturer's control); but see Embry 
v. General Motors, 115 Ariz. 433, 565 P.2d 1794 (1974) (exclusion of recall letters 
not reversible error); see generally Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 1220 (1978). 
3 See, e.g., Smith v. Ariens Co., 375 Mass. 620, 377 N.E.2d 954 (1978). 
4 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 940, 387 N.E.2d 583. 
" [d. at 950, 387 N.E.2d at 587. 
6 [d. at 950, 387 N.E.2d at 587-88. 
7 [d. at 942, 387 N.E.2d at 584. 
8 [d. at 941, 387 N.E.2d at 584. 
9 [d. 
9
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to a speed of fifty or sixty miles per hour.10 He stepped on the brake 
pedal when the car was twenty-five feet from the collision point.H 
The plaintiffs' case rested largely on the testimony of an expert wit-
ness, a mechanical engineer.12 The expert testified that one of three 
defects probably caused the events related by the two plaintiffs,13 As 
part of their case-in-chief the plaintiffs offered proof, in the form of a 
recall letter distributed by General Motors in 1969, that General Motors 
notified owners of vehicles similar in model and design to that owned 
by the plaintiff that the cam and throttle mechanisms were potentially 
defective. H The defendant objected but the trial judge admitted the 
recall letter.10 
On appeal, the Supreme JudiCial Court held that the recall letter had 
been properly admitted, but only on the specific issue of whether the 
defect originated while the product was under the defendant's control,16 
The Court ruled that before a recall letter may be admitted, the plaintiff 
first must offer independent proof that a defect existed in the particular 
vehicle involved in the occurrence.17 In the case at hand, the Court 
observed, the plaintiff's expert had testified that a defective cam could 
have interfered with the throttle mechanism and caused the accident.1s 
Having met this threshold proof requirement, the plaintiff was entitled 
to introduce the recall letter, in effect an admission by General Motors, 
to establish that the defect had occurred while the vehicle was still in 
the defendant's hands.10 The Court rejected the defendant's argument 
that the admission of recall letters as evidence of a defect's existence 
at the time of manufacture would inhibit manufacturers from initiating 
recall campaigns.20 Noting that federal law compels recall campaigns, 
the Court concluded that its decision could not discourage a practice 
that is required by law and is in no way voluntary.21 
§14.5. Legal Malpractice-Survival of Actions. Until McStowe v. 
Bornstein 1 was decided during the Survey year, the question of the sur-
10 ld. at 942, 387 N.E.2d at 584. 
11 ld.. Both plaintiffs had recently left a party where both had been drinking. 
The plaintiff passenger was intoxicated. ld. at 941, 387 N.E.2d at 584. 
12 ld. at 943, 387 N.E.2d at 585. 
13 ld. at 945, 387 N.E.2d at 586. 
14 ld. at 950, 387 N.E.2d at 587. 
15 ld. 
16 ld. at 950, 387 N.E.2d at 587-88. See generally 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIED-
MAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.01 (5) (1978). 
17 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 950, 387 N.E.2d at 588. 
18 ld. at 951, 387 N.E.2d at 588. 
III ld. at 951-52, 387 N.E.2d at 588. 
20 ld. at 952, 387 N.E.2d at 588. 
21 ld.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1411 (1976). 
§14.5. 1 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1024, 388 N.E.2d 674. See also Conunent, 64 
MASS. L. REV. 182 (1979). 
10
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vival of malpractice actions against a deceased attorney was decided on 
traditional common law principles. If the complaint was framed as a 
negligence action, it did not survive. ~ If it was framed as an action in 
contract, it did.a McStowe, however, recognized that legal malpractice 
actions, regardless of the manner of pleadings, are based on a breach 
of an attorney's contractual obligation to the client and therefore should 
survive.4 
In McStot/:e, the plaintiff sued the representatives of the attorney's 
estate, alleging malpractice.5 The representatives defended on the 
ground that, under chapter 228, section 1,6 governing the survival of 
certain tort actions, and common law principles, a tort action based upon 
the negligence of an attorney did not survive. 7 On appeal, the Supreme 
Judicial Court declined to observe rigid procedural distinctions between 
actions in tort and actions in contract, determining instead that the gist 
of a legal malpractice complaint is the attorney's breach of contract.s 
Therefore, the Court ruled that the existence of a contractual relation-
ship between the plaintiff and the deceased attorney permitted the action 
to survive.!> Because it rested its decision on the common law rule that 
contract actions survive a defendant's death, the Court found that it did 
not need to consider whether section 1 of chapter 228 barred the action.10 
Hence, the Court adopted the general rule in force in other jurisdictions 11 
that actions for malpractice may be brought against the estate of a 
deceased attorney.12 
§14.6. Child Trespassers-Duty of Reasonable Care. In 1974, the 
Supreme JudiCial Court, in Pridgen v. Boston Housing Authority,! sig-
2 Connors v. Newton Nat'l Bank, 336 Mass. 649, 147 N.E.2d 185 (1958). 
3 See Griffiths v. Powers, 216 Mass. 169, 103 N.E. 468 (1913); Drury v. Butler, 
171 Mass. 171, 50 N.E. 527 (1898). 
4 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1028, 1029, 388 N.E.2<l at 676. 
u ld. at 1026, 388 N.E.2d at 675. 
H G.L. c. 228, § 1, provides in relevant part: "In addition to the actions which 
survive by the common law, the following shall survive: ... (2) Actions of tort 
( a) for assault, battery, imprisonment or other damage to the person . . . or (d) 
for damage to real or personal property . . .." ld. 
7 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1026, 388 N.E.2d at 676. 
~ ld. at 1209, 388 N.E.2<l at 677 (citing Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Killeen, 1979 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 129, 384 N.E.2d 1231). 
9 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1029, 388 N.E.2d at 677. 
10 ld. 
II See Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 1211 (1959). 
1 ~ The Court left undecided the question of which statute of limitations would 
apply to an action against an attorney. Noting that in the medical malpractice field 
the issue has been decided by statute, the Court suggested that the issue with 
respect to attorney malpractice might be similarly settled. ld. at 1030-31 & 1031 
n.5, 388 N.E.2d at 677 n.5. 
§14.6. 1 364 Mass. 696, 308 N.E.2<l 467 (1974); see 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. 
LAW § 6.8, at 116-19. 
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nificantly modified traditional rules with respect to the duties owed by 
an owner or occupier of property toward trespassers.!! Prior to Pridgen, 
an owner or occupier of property needed only to refrain from wilful, 
wanton, or reckless conduct in the management of his premises.3 In 
Pridgen, a child became "helplessly trapped" in an elevator shaft owned 
and maintained by the defendant.-1 The Court held that once a property 
owner learns that a trespasser is "helplessly trapped" on his property, the 
owner mllst exercise reasonable care to prevent injury, including taking 
affirmative action if needed." During the Survey year, the Massachu-
setts appellate courts considered two cases involving child trespassers. 
In Kalinkowski v. Smith," the Appeals Court considered the case of a 
child in a position of danger who, while not trapped, was unaware of 
the impending danger because of her age! On many previous occa-
sions, she had stood beside the tracks of a commuter train in order to 
wave to the trainmen. 8 On the day in question, the plaintiff was beside 
the tracks as the train approached along a level track at approximately 
20 to 25 miles per hour.n After sounding its whistle, the train proceeded 
along the tracks. lO The child, however, was too close to the tracks, was 
struck by the train, and was severely injured. l1 At the conclusion of 
the plaintiff's opening statement, the trial judge granted the defense 
motion for a directed verdict.12 
In a terse opinion, the Appeals Court considered the case in light of 
Pridgen 13 and held that the facts alleged by the plaintiff were sufficient 
to warrant a jury verdict that the trainmen had not exercised reasonable 
care in operating the train.H Although the child was not phYSically 
trapped, the Court concluded that her inability to appreciate the danger 
made her position "tantamount to that of the helplessly trapped child 
in Pridgen." 15 Furthermore, once the trainmen had observed the child, 
a jury could have concluded that the conductor and engineer did not 
2 364 Mass. at 705, 308 N.E.2d at 475. 
3 Id.; see Urban v. Central Mass. Elec. Co., 301 Mass. 519, 523, 17 N.E.2d 718, 
721 (1938). 
4 364 Mass. at 700, 308 N.E.2d at 470. 
5 Id. at 711-13, 308 N.E.2d at 477. 
6 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1261, 383 N.E.2d 550. 
7 Id. at 1262, 383 N.E.2d at 551. The plaintiff was four years old at the time 
of the incident. Id. 
BId. at 1262, 383 N.E.2d at 551. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 1262-63, 383 N.E.2d at 551. The train's whistle was sounded approxi-
mately 600 feet from the point of the accident. Id. 
11 Id. at 1263, 383 N.E.2d at 551. 
12 Id. at 1261, 383 N.E.2d at 550. 
13 Id. at 1263, 383 N.E.2d at 551-52. 
14 Id. at 1265, 383 N.E.2d at 552. 
15 Id. at 1263, 383 N.E.2d at 552. 
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exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to the plaintiff.16 At the very 
least, the Court noted, the operators could have sounded a warning and 
slowed the train down.17 
In a similar decision during the Survey year, Soule v. Massachusetts 
Electric Co.,18 the Supreme Judicial Court considered the rights of a 
child injured while playing on property owned by the defendant,lo In 
Soule, an eight-year-old plaintiff20 was playing with friends on town 
property commonly used by townspeople for recreational purposes.21 
Across the town property was an easement used by the defendant power 
company for its power lines.22 At one point along the lines, the com-
pany placed a switching station, with electrical equipment inside, on a 
wooden platform apprOximately eight to fifteen feet above the ground.23 
The plaintiff, thinking the station would make a "good lookout tower," 24 
climbed the station and struck his head inside a hole in the floor of the 
station.25 He contacted an uninsulated wire inside and was severely 
burned.26 Answering special questions, the jury returned a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff.27 The trial judge, however, granted a defense 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and entered judgment 
for the defendant. 28 
Reversing the trial judge's ruling and reinstating the jury verdict,29 
the Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendant was required to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to foreseeable child trespas-
sers.30 To reach such a conclusion, the Court ruled that a statutory 
exception for child trespassers,31 enacted after the accident, did not 
foreclose judicial action to accomplish, as a matter of common law, a 
similar result retroactively.32 Noting that the evolution of tort law was 
a process strongly influenced by the courts, the Court in Soule declared 
16 ld. 
17 ld. at 1265, 383 N.E.2d at 552. 
18 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1380, 390 N.E.2d 716. 
l\) ld. at 1380, 390 N.E.2d at 717. 
2U ld. The incident occurred in 1954 when the plaintiff was eight years old. 
The Court does not explain the reason for the lengthy delay between the time 
of the incident and the time of trial. 
21 ld. at 1382, 390 N.E.2d at 718. 
22 ld. 
23 ld. at 1381-82, 390 N.E.2d at 717-18. 
24 ld. at 1382, 390 N.E.2d at 718. 
25 ld. at 1383, 390 N.E.2d at 718. 
261d. 
27 ld. at 1381, 390 N.E.2d at 717. 
281d. 
20 ld. 
30 ld. at 1385, 390 N.E.2d at 719. 
31 G.L. c. 231, § 85Q, added by Acts of 1977, c. 259. 
32 ld. at 1385, 390 N.E.2d at 719. 
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that questions of tort law arc "appropriately a subject for both legisla-
tive and judicial lawmaking." 33 Since judicial action was appropriate, 
the Court, extending the rationale of earlier decisions, declared that prop-
erty owners must exercise reasonable care where the presence of a child 
trespasser is a foreseeable event.34 
Like the Appeals Court in Kalinkowski, the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Soule was willing to interpret liberally the requirements of the Pridgen 
decision. In Soule, the defendant had no knowledge of the dangerous 
condition in the sWitching station or the presence of the trespassing 
child.35 The Pridgen rule, which requires a property owner to exercise 
reasonable care, was originally effective only when the owner was aware 
of the trespasser's presence.36 The Court in Soule effectively dispensed 
with this requirement and substituted an objective test which looks to 
the reasonable foreseeability of the presence of a trespassing child.37 
These two decisions by commonwealth appellate courts continue the 
trend, begun in recent years, of extending greater protection to child 
trespassers. as The rule enunciated in Soule brings Massachusetts into 
conformity with the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions which have 
rejected the position that accords greater protection to property owners 
than to trespassing children.311 The only question which remains is 
whether the same protections will be extended to adult trespassers when 
such a question is presented on appea1.40 
§14.7. Negligence-Licensees and Trespassers. In Monterosso v. 
Gaudette,! decided during the Survey year, the Appeals Court clarified 
the legal distinction drawn between licensees and trespassers for the 
purpose of determining the duty owed by an owner or occupier of land 
to persons present on his property.2 In Monterosso, the plaintiff was 
injured when she fell in the common hallway of a commercial building.3 
33 Id. at 1390, 390 N.E.2d at 721. See also Poirier v. Plymouth, 1978 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 100, 372 N.E.2d 212; Mounse.y v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 29-7 N.E.2d 43 (1973). 
34 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1389, 390 N.E.2d at 720-21. 
35 Id. at 1380-83, 390 N.E.2d at 717-18. 
36 364 Mass. 600, 711-13. 
37 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1389, 390 N.E.2d at 720-21. 
38 See note 33 supra. 
30 At the time Soule was decided, only Maryland, New Hampshire, Ohio, and 
Vermont did not recognize a "child trespasser" exception. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1388 n.lO, 390 N.E.2d at 720 n.10. 
40 See the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hennessey and Justice Kaplan, 
1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1393, 390 N.E.2d at 722 (Hennessey, C.J., concurring) 
and id. at 1394, 390 N.E.2d at 722. (Kaplan, J., concurring). 
§14.7. 1 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv Sh. 1467, 391 N.E.2d 948. 
2 Id. at 1477-79, 391 N.E.2d at 955-56. 
3 Id. at 1467, 391 N.E.2d at 951. The plaintiff was a customer of one of the 
tenants of the. building. Id. at 1470, 391 N.E.2d at 952. 
14
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1979 [1979], Art. 17
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1979/iss1/17
§14.7 TORTS 385 
The plaintiff brought an action in negligence against the defendant lessee 
of a portion of the building. 4 The trial judge denied the defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict and sent the case to the jury.5 
One principal issue in the case was whether the plaintiff, at the time 
of the accident, was a licensee or trespasser.G In his charge to the jury, 
the trial judge noted that there is no longer any distinction made be-
tween licensees and invitees in determining the standard of care owed 
to third parties.' He then stated that a licensee is owed a duty of 
reasonable care in the maintenance of the premises, while a trespasser 
is owed only the duty to refrain from wilful, wanton, or reckless con-
duct. H In describing the legal difference between licensees and tres-
passers, the trial judge instructed the jury that a trespasser is one who 
lacks "an invitation, express or implied," to be on the defendant's prop-
erty.!! In answer to special questions, the jury found that the defendant 
had been causally negligent, but that the plaintiff was a mere trespasser 
on the defendant's premises. lO Consequently, a judgment was entered 
in favor of the defendant and the plaintiff appealed.l1 
The Appeals Court ruled that the trial judge's charge was inadequate 
with respect to the definitional distinction drawn between trespassers 
and licensees.12 The court held that the instruction tying "the lawful-
ness of the visit to an invitation ... " was erroneous,13 because such a 
standard ignored a middle ground presented by the evidence.14 By 
casting the charge in terms of "mutually exclusive categories," the trial 
judge had foreclosed the possibility that the defendant's conduct may 
have provided the plaintiff "with reason to believe she could enter if 
she so desired." l~ Thus, the court suggested that the plaintiff may have 
been privileged to enter the hallway. In such a case, the defendant would 
have owed her a duty of reasonable care. IG Because the instructions did 
not adequately explain this "middle ground" raised by the evidence, the 
court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial,17 
4 ld. at 1467-68, 391 N.E.2d at 951. The defendant also brought an action 
against the owner and a second tenant. The trial judge allowed directed verdicts 
in favor of these defendants. ld. 
5 ld. at 1468, 391 N.E.2d at 951. 
6 ld. at 1477, 391 N.E.2d at 955. 
7 ld. 
SId. 
!l ld. (emphasis in original). 
10 ld. at 1468, 391 N.E.2d at 951. 
11 ld. 
12 ld. at 1477-78, 391 N.E.2d at 955. 
13 ld. at 1478, 391 N.E.2d at 955. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. 
16 ld. 
17 ld. 
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In essence, the Court in Monterosso expanded the concept of implied 
invitation. One test for determining whether a plaintiff was given an 
implied invitation is to assess the defendant's conduct. In Monterosso, 
the court also permitted the jury to look to the plaintiff's understanding 
of the defendant's conduct.18 The test, however, should be an objeotive 
one, which determines whether the plaintiff was reasonable, in light of 
all the circumstances, in implying an invitation to enter the defendant's 
premises. 
§14.8. Negligence-Landlord and Tenant. Since the 1973 Supreme 
Judicial Court decision in Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway,! 
a landlord has been held to convey an implied warranty of habitability 
whenever he leases a rental unit for dwelling purposes.2 Abandoning 
archaic common law principles, the Court in Hemingway held that an 
essential element of any lease is the landlord's duty to keep the premises 
fit for human habitation.3 During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial 
Court, in Crowell v. McCatfrey,4 considered whether a tenant may 
recover damages for personal injuries arising from a violation of the 
implied warranty of habitability. 5 
In Crowell, a tenant was injured when the porch railing against which 
he was leaning gave way.6 The porch was across a hallway from the 
door to the plaintiff's third-floor apartment.7 While the plaintiff was 
told that he could use the porch "in the summertime," 8 the tenant paid 
rent only for the apartment itself.9 The railing was shown to have been 
in bad repair and, after the accident, the landlord boarded up the win-
dow giving access to the porch.10 The plaintiff alleged that defendant 
had been negligent in maintaining an area in his controlP The plain-
tiff further alleged that if the porch was part of the rented premises, 
the defendant had breached the implied warranty of habitability,12 Dur-
ing the trial, the plaintiff attempted to introduce pertinent sections of 
18 Id. 
§14.8. 1 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Schwartz, Property and Con-
veyancing, 1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 1.9, at 18-46. 
2 363 Mass. at 199, 293 N.E.2d at 843. 
3 Id. 
4 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 568, 386 N.E.2d 1256. 
5 This was one of two theories advanced by the plaintiff. The other theory 
alleged simple negligence in the maintenance of the building's common areas. See 
text at note 11 infra. 
6 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 569, 386 N.E.2d at 1258. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 568-69, 386 N.E.2d at 1258. 
12 Id. at 569, 386 N.E.2d at 1258. 
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the State Building Code and the State Housing Code.13 The trial judge 
excluded this evidence.14 At the close of the plaintiff's case, the trial 
judge granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on both 
counts.15 
Acting on the plaintiff's motion for direct appellate review, the Suo 
. preme Judicial Court reversed the trial court and held that sufficient 
evidence was presented to the jury on either count to support a finding 
in favor of the plaintiff.16 The Court determined that if the jury found 
that the porch remained under the defendant's control, then the land-
lord could have been negligent in maintaining the porch.17 If, however, 
the porch was part of the rented premises, the landlord could have 
breached his warranty to comply "with minimum standards prescribed 
by the State Building Code and the State Sanitary Code." 18 Further-
more, the Court concluded, the statutory provisions from the building 
and housing codes were relevant on either the negligence or warranty 
issues and, consequently, should have been admitted by the trial judge.19 
The important aspect of Crowell is the Supreme Judicial Court's con-
clusion that the implied warranty of habitability necessarily includes li-
ability for injuries caused by a breach.20 When a landlord leases a 
rental dwelling unit, he makes an implied agreement that the unit "com-
plies with minimum standards prescribed by building and sanitary codes 
and that he will do whatever these codes require for compliance .... " 21 
In the present case, the Court concluded, the jury would have been 
warranted in finding that the landlord, by the exercise of reasonable 
care, could have discovered the defects in the porch.22 
As a result of the Crowell decision, a tenant now has the right to re-
cover far injuries that arise from a violation of the building codes, even 
if the defect arises after the tenant occupies the premises. Furthermore, 
the tenant may not even have to prove lack of due care on the part 
of the landlord in discovering the defects. The Court refused to consider 
whether a tenant must comply with statutory notice requirements in 
order to preserve the right to sue in the event of injury.23 While there 
was evidence showing that the landlord's failure to discover the defects 
13 ld. at 569-70, 386 N.E.2d at 1258. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. at 568, 386 N.E.2d at 1258. 
16 ld. at 568-69, 386 N.E.2d at 1258. 
17 ld. 
18 ld. at 569, 386 N.E.2d at 1258. 
19 ld. 
20 ld. at 578, 386 N.E.2d at 1261. 
21 ld. at 579, 386 N.E.2d at 1261-62. 
22 ld. at 579, 386 N.E.2d at 1262. 
23 ld. 
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was unreasonable, the Court also declined to consider whether such a 
jury finding is "essential to liability."24 It is possible, therefore, that 
the Court, in the future, may impose upon a landlord strict liability for 
injuries which arise from building or s~nitary code violations. 
§14.9. Intentional and Negligent InDiction of Emotional Distress. In 
1971 in George v. Jordan Marsh Company,! the Supreme Judicial Court 
joined a substantial number of jurisdictions 2 and recognized the tort of 
intentional inDiction of emotional distress. During this Survey year, 
the Court, in Boyle v. Wenk 3 and Harrison v. Loyal Protective Insur-
ance Co.,4 refined and extended this developing tort. More significantly, 
during the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in the landmark 
decision of Dziokonski v. Babineau,5 further expanded the rights of 
plaintiffs to recover for emotional injury by recognizing the distinct tort 
of negligent inDiction of emotional distress. 
In Boyle v. Wenk, which concerned an allegation of intentional inHic-
tion of emotional distress,6 the defendant Wenk was employed by Con-
sulting Investigators, Inc., to do private investigative work. He was 
asked to gather information concerning the health and capacity for work 
of a John Walsh.; The plaintiff, a Mrs. Boyle, was Walsh's sister-in-law. 
Walsh and his wife lived in an apartment located in the home of 
Mrs. Boyle. 8 At some point, the defendant telephoned the Boyle home, 
spoke with Mrs. Boyle, and attempted to question her about Walsh.9 
The plaintiff suggested that Walsh be contacted directly and asked not 
to be called again. lO She also told the defendant that she had just been 
discharged from the hospital.ll 
The following week Wenk again telephoned the Boyle home at one 
o'clock in the morning.12 He spoke with the plaintiff, who was alone 
at home with her children. She told him not to telephone again.13 
Mrs. Boyle testified at trial that this call left her in great distress.14 
Despite the plaintiff's requests, the defendant appeared at the Walsh 
24 ld. at 579-80, 386 N.E.2d at 1262. 
§14.9. 1 George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 917 (1971). 
2 See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 12 (4th ed. 1971). 
3 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1947,392 N.E.2d 1053. 
4 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2477, 396 N.E.2d 987. 
5 375 Mass. 555, 380 N .E.2d 1295 (1978). 
6 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1947, 392 N.E.2d at 1054. 
7 ld. at 1948, 392 N.E.2d at 1054. 
sId. 
u ld. at 1948-49, 392 N.E.2d at 1054. 
10 ld. at 1948-49, 392 N.E.2d at 1054-55. 
11 ld. 
12 ld. at 1949, 392 N.E.2d at 1055. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. 
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apartment and was invited upstairs by Mrs. Walsh. At this time Wenk 
admitted to Mrs. Boyle, who was also present, that he was the individual 
attempting to contact Mr. Walsh,l5 Mrs. Boyle told him that she had 
been terrified by his calls. ls During the course of a conversation, Wenk 
asserted, in the presence of Mrs. Boyle, that he had been "in prison too 
for rape."17 The police were called, and when they arrived the defend-
ant falsely asserted he was a police officer. 18 Evidence introduced at 
trial indicated that Mrs. Boyle was visibly agitated both at her home 
and later at the police station. Furthermore, she began to hemorrhage 
at the station and was forced to leave the station to seek medical atten-
tion. iii NIl's. Boyle underwent both physical and psychiatric care for 
injuries, which evidence established were causally connected to the 
conduct of Wenk,2U At trial, the trial judge denied the defendant's mo-
tions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.21 
The sole issue on appeal was whether the plaintiff had presented sufficient 
evidence to support the favorable verdict.22 
Rejecting the defendant's contention that the evidence showed only 
insulting or annoying conduct, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
evidence warranted a finding that Wenk's actions were extreme and 
outrageous.:!:l The Court observed that, while anyone of the incidents 
might not appear particularly egregious, the jury was not bound to view 
the evidence in isolation.24 Rather, the Court ruled the jury could look 
to the totality of the circumstances to find the element of extreme and 
outrageous conduct going "beyond all possible bounds of decency." 25 
In conclusion, the Court stated that repeated harassment may compound 
the offending nature of individual incidents, which alone might not be 
suffiCiently extreme to support a finding of liability.26 
In reaching its decision, the Court was strongly influenced by evidence 
that the defendant was on notice that the plaintiff may have been par-
ticularly susceptible to emotional distress.27 While Wenk was not actu-
ally aware of Mrs. Boyle's specific physical problems, the Court found 
that he had received sufficient notice of her weakened condition when 
15 ld. 
16 ld. 
17 ld. 
18 ld. 
19 ld. 
20 ld. at 1950, 392 N.E.2d at 1055. 
21 ld. at 1947, 392 N.E.2d at 1054. 
2:! ld. at 1948, 392 N.E.2d at 1054. 
23 ld. at 1951, 392 N.E.2d at 1055. 
24 ld. at 1951, 392 N.E.2d at 1055-56. 
25 ld. at 1950-51, 392 N.E.2d at 1055-56. 
26 ld. at 1051, 392 N.E.2d at 1056. 
27 ld. at 1052, 392 N.E.2d at 1056. 
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she informed him in the first phone call that she had just left the hos-
pital. 28 While the Court did not go so far as to hold that a defendant 
must take the plaintiff as he finds him, the Court in Boyle did liberally 
construe the evidence that the defendant was on notice of the plaintiff's 
infirmities. Thus, it appears that where there is a series of harassing 
incidents accompanied by reasonable evidence that the defendant was 
on notice of the plaintiff's particular vulnerability to such incidents, the 
Supreme Judicial Court will not overturn a jury's finding that the de-
fendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous. 
In Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance CO.,29 the Supreme 
Judicial Court considered whether an action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress survives the death of the injured party.30 In Harri-
son, the plaintiff alleged that Fitzwilliam, an officer of the defendant 
corporation, knowing that the plaintiff's decedent had cancer and was 
unable to continue working for the defendant,31 threatened Harrison, 
that, if Harrison applied for physical disability benefits, he would not 
be permitted to return to his job should he regain his health.32 The 
plaintiff claimed that this action led to a deterioration of Harrison's 
physical condition, destroyed his will to live, and, ultimately, contributed 
to his death.33 The defendant moved to dismiss. The trial judge 
granted the motion on the ground that the action did not survive the 
death of the injured party.34 The judge's ruling was consistent with 
prior case law, which had narrowly construed the state survival statute.35 
Finding that these prior decisions were not controlling, the Supreme 
Judicial Court on appeal held that the new tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, which allows recovery for solely emotional injury,36 
does survive the death of the injured party.37 Noting that the earlier 
decisions had been decided before emotional injury was recognized as 
a legally redressable harm, the Court applied a liberal interpretation to 
the "flexibly drawn" survival statute.38 The Court construed the statu-
28 Id. 
:/1) 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2477, 396 N.E.2d 987. 
30 Id. at 2477, 396 N.E.2d at 988. 
31 ld. at 2478, 396 N.E.2d at 988. 
32 ld. 
33 ld. 
34 [d. at 2477-78, 396 N.E.2d at 988. G.L. c. 228, § 1, as amended by Acts of 
1975, c. 377, § 62, reads in pertinent part: "In addition to the actions which 
survive by common law the follOWing shall survive: . . . (2) Actions of tort (a) 
for assault, battery, imprisonment or other damage to the person .... " ld. 
35 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2478, 396 N.E.2d at 989. See, e.g., Keating v. Boston 
Elevated Ry., 209 Mass. 278, 95 N.E.2d 840 (1911) (action for damages to a father 
resulting from personal injury to his minor child did not survive under the statute). 
3G 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2480, 396 N.E.2d at 915 (1971). See George v. 
Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 915 (1971). 
37 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2477, 396 N.E.2d at 988. 
38 ld. at 2479, 396 N.E . .2d at 989. 
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tory language "damage to the person" to include injury to the emotional 
person as well as the physical person.39 
Having concluded that this tort is within the purview of the survival 
statute, the Court in Harrison considered whether, as a matter of public 
policy, an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress should 
be allowed to survive.40 In essence, the Court was concerned whether 
either the potential for fraud or difficulty of proof might outweigh the 
benefit to those plaintiffs with legally compensable damages.41 Noting 
that an action for assault survives the death of a party, the Court con-
sidered that it would be "anomalous" to allow the survival of a tort like 
assault, which permits recovery for both emotional and physical injury, 
however slight, while denying the survival of a tort for severe emotional 
injury.42 With respect to problems of proof, the Court did not find any 
of the potential evidentiary problems of sufficient moment to warrant 
continuance of the non-survival rule.43 It determined that good faith 
statements of the plaintiff's decedent concerning susceptibility to injury 
or to actual injury would be admissible.H Any weakness in this evidence 
or other similar evidence would be a question of weight to be resolved 
by the jury.45 
Boyle and Harrison indicate the Supreme JudiCial Court's receptive 
attitude toward claims alleging significant emotional injury. Viewed 
in this light, it is not surprising that the Court, in Dziokonski v. Babi-
neau, recognized the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.46 
In Dziokonski, the plaintiff brought an action on behalf of Mrs. Dziokon-
ski, whose daughter was injured when she was hit by an automobile 
driven by the defendant. 47 The child was struck as she crossed the 
street after getting off a school bus.48 The plaintiff alleged that the 
child's mother arrived at the accident scene, observed her injured daugh-
ter lying in the road, suffered emotional shock and resulting physical 
injury, and died while she was riding in the ambulance that was taking 
her daughter to the hospital,49 The administratrix also brought a com-
plaint on behalf of Mr. Dziokonski, the child's father. Mr. Dziokonski 
was alleged to have suffered emotional and physical trauma, ending 
39 rd. at 2480, 396 N.E.2d at 990. 
40 rd. at 2480-81, 396 N.E.2d at 990. 
41 rd. at 2481, 396 N.E.2d at 990. 
42 rd. 
43 rd. at 2482, 396 N.E.2d at 990-91. 
44 rd. at 2483, 396 N.E.2d at 991. 
45 rd. 
46 375 Mass. 568, 380 N.E.2d at 1302-03. 
47 rd. at 557, 380 N.E.2d at 1296. The plaintiff also brought actions against 
the bus driver and the owner of the vehicle. rd. 
48 rd. 
49 rd. 
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ultimately in his death, as a result of the injuries to his daughter and 
the death of his wife.50 Both complaints contained counts for wrongful 
death and for conscious suffering. 51 The trial judge, acting on the 
defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, dismissed all claims against all the defendants.52 
Upon its own motion, the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appel-
late review.53 
Overruling time-honored precedent, the Supreme Judicial Court re-
versed the trial judge's ruling and held that the so-called "impact rule," 
established in the commonwealth in Spade v. Lynn and Boston Rail-
road}4 should be abandoned.55 Spade had required that there be some 
impact to the person of the plaintiff-no matter how slight-to permit 
the plaintiff to recover for emotional distress. 56 After discussing at 
length the history and subsequent modification of the Spade rule, the 
Court concluded that the impact requirement was no longer a persuasive 
standard. 57 While the Spade Court had originally accepted the rule to 
guard against fraudulent claims, the Court in Dziokonski declared that 
"the threat of fraudulent claims" is not sufficient to warrant an absolute 
bar against all claims whether legitimate or not.58 The trier of fact, the 
Court stated, is best equipped to determine both the question of causa-
tion and the question of reasonable foreseeability when determining 
whether phYSical injury has resulted from emotional distress.59 
Having concluded that absence of impact should not be an automatic 
bar to recovery, the Court addressed the question of the causal connec-
tion between the injury to a child and the parent's emotional response 
to that injury. GO The Court reasoned that if a motor vehicle is negli-
gently operated so as to cause injury, the operator should reasonably 
foresee that one or more persons may be "sufficiently emotionally at-
tached" to the injured party to be affected by such conduct.61 Recog-
nizing that a parent of an injured child would be such a person, the 
Court held that a parent may recover damages for "substantial physical 
harm sustained as a result of severe mental distress over some peril or 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 556, 380 N.E.2d at 1296. 
53 Id. 
54 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). 
55 375 Mass. at 556, 380 N.E.2d at 1296. 
56 168 Mass. at 290, 47 N.E. at 88. 
57 375 Mass. at 562, 380 N.E.2d at 1297. 
58 Id. at 565-66, 380 N.E.2d at 1301. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 566, 380 N.E.2d at 1301. 
61 Id. at 567, 380 N.E.2d at 1302. 
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harm to his minor child caused by the defendant's negligence. "62 
In order to limit the scope of its holding, however, the Court further 
held that recovery would be permitted only "where the parent either 
witnesses the accident or soon comes on the scene while the child is 
still there." G3 
On the basis of this holding, the Court reinstated the complaints 
brought on behalf of both deceased parents. With respect to the claim 
for the mother's injury and death, the Court ruled that the complaint 
clearly alleged sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss.64 With 
respect to the claim for the father's injury and death, however, the Court 
noted that further information was necessary. The complaint did not 
allege when, where, or how the father received knowledge of the injury 
to his daughter.r.:; Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the lack of 
such specific allegations did not, as a matter of law, doom the complaint. 
Instead, the Court noted that the allegations were sufficient to include 
some circumstances which would justify recovery.GG Thtis, the Court 
concluded that neither complaint should have been dismissed.67 
Two questions remain to be resolved in subsequent decisions. While 
the facts of Dziokonski were those of a parent observing injury to her 
child, the standard would appear to include similar situations where the 
plaintiff is able to prove sufficient emotional attachment between the 
injured party and the plaintiff.68 Thus, for example, a child may recover 
after observing injury to one of his parents. Second, the Court explicitly 
reserved the issue of whether emotional injury unaccompanied by 
physical injury should be compensable.6!) In its opinion, the Court gave 
no indication of the result it would reach should such a question be 
presented. Nevertheless, the requirement in Dziokonski of substantial 
physical harm 70 would indicate that the Court may not be receptive to 
a claim involving only emotional injury. 
62 ld. at 568, 380 N.E.2d at 1302. 
63 ld. 
G4 ld. at 568, 380 N.E.2d at 1303. 
65 ld. The complaint simply alleged the Mr. Dziokonski's injuries resulted from 
his distress over learning the news of his wife's death and his daughter's injuries. 
ld. at 562 n.9, 380 N.E.2d at 1299 n.9. 
66 ld. at 569, 380 N.E.2d at 1303. Justice Quirico dissented, stating that the 
Court "should not prescribe rules that allow or deny recovery by the. parent on 
the basis of the speed and efficiency of an am,bulance team in responding to an 
accident call, or on the haste with which a parent can be notified and rushed to 
the accident scene." ld. at 571, 380 N.E.2d at 1303-04 (Quirico, J., dissenting). 
67 ld. at 569, 380 N.E.2d at 1303. 
68 ld. at 567, 380 N.E.2d at 1302. Justice Quirico, who, in his dissent argued 
for a stricter rule than that adopted by the majority, would have, within the limits 
of his rule, permitted recovery to other close relatives. ld. at 570 n.2, 380 N.E.2d 
at 1303 n.2 (Quirico, J., dissenting). 
69 ld. at 560 n.6, 380 N.E.2d at 1298 n.6. 
70 ld. at 566, 380 N.E.2d at 1302. 
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The decision in Dziokonski places Massachusetts among a small min-
ority of states recognizing the tort of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress.71 Together with the decisions in Boyle and Harrison, the Su-
preme Judicial Court has showed a willingness to depart from prior 
precedent. In so doing, it has expanded the soope of protection avail-
able to plaintiffs who have experienced emotional injuries. 
§14.10. Medical Malpractice Screening Tribunals-Scope and Ap-
plication. In 1975, the General Court enacted a statute establishing a 
medical malpractice screening tribunal to review actions involving medi-
cal malpractice or mistake brought against health care providers and 
health care institutions. 1 In 1977, the Supreme Judicial Court in Paro 
v. Longwood Hospital,2 upheld the constitutionality of the tribunal pro-
cess. During the Survey year, several Supreme Judicial Court decisions 3 
addressed the scope and authOrity of medical malpractice screening 
tribunals. 
In Little v. Rosenthal,4 the plaintiff filed four separate actions against 
an individual doctor and a nursing home alleging acts of malpractice 
and violations of chapter 93A, the Consumer Protection Act.5 Over the 
plaintiff's objeetion, all the actions were submitted to malpraotice tribu-
nals for review.6 With respect to all four actions, the panels found that 
the evidence presented was insufficient to raise a legitimate question 
appropriate for judidal inquiry.7 The plaintiff therefore was required 
to post bond in order to continue the actions.S The plaintiff declined 
to post bond, and, when the actions were dismissed, appealed.9 
71 See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 
(1968); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Toms v. McCon-
nell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 
R.!. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975). 
§14.1O. 1 C.L. c. 231, §§ 6OB-60E, added by Acts of 1975, c. 634, § 1. 
2 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977). 
3 McMahon v. Clixman, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2277, 393 N.E.2d 875; Salem 
Orthopedic Surgeons, Inc. v. Quinn, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 661, 386 N.E.2d 1268; 
Little v. Rosenthal, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2793, 382 N.E.2d 1037. 
4 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2793, 382 N.E.2d 1037. 
5 C.L. c. 93A. 
6 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2795, 382 N.E.2d at 1040. The complaints included 
allegations of substandard care while plaintiff was resident in a nursing home, which 
resulted in dehydration and bed sores requiring the plaintiff's transfer to a hospital. 
The complaints also alleged violations of the Department of Public Hea1th Rules 
and RegulationS for the Licensing of Long Term Care Facilities. ld. 
7 ld. at 2794, 382 N.E.2d at 1040. 
8 C.L. c. 231, § 60B, provides that on a finding by the screening tribunal that 
there is no legitimate question for judicial inquiry, the plaintiff may continue the 
action only by posting bond in the amount of $2,000 to cover the defendant's costs 
in the event that the plaintiff ultimately does not prevail. ld. 
9 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2794, 382 N.E.2d at 1040. 
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Transferring the case on its own motion, the Supreme Judicial Court 
upheld the determinations of the malpractice tribunals. Rejecting the 
plaintiff's contention that chapter 93A claims were not proper subject 
matter for screening panel review, the Court held that the statute re-
quired that all treatment-related claims be referred to a malpractice 
tribunal,1° The Court also rejected the plaintiff's claim that the screen-
ing panels had exceeded the scope of their authOrity by applying too 
stringent a standard to her offer of proof,u Section 60B of chapter 231 
requires the malpractice tribunal to determine "if the evidence presented 
if properly substantiated is sufficient to raise a legitimate question ap-
propriate for judicial inquiry or whether the plaintiff's case is merely 
an unfortunate medical result." 12 The Court rejected the plaintifFs 
claim that this language required the tribunal to assume a role analogous 
to that of a judge faced with a motion for dismissal under rule 12( b)( 6) 
of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure.13 Instead, it found that 
the statute, however imprecise, required the plaintiff to allege more than 
facts constituting a legal cause of action. The Court concluded that 
the tribunal's screening process was comparable to a trial judge's func-
tion in ruling on a motion for a direoted verdict.14 Applying this stan-
dard, the Court ruled that the screening panels were not in error in 
concluding that the plaintiff's allegations failed to raise a legitimate 
question of liability.15 
The Court's holding in Little, if strictly applied, places the burden on 
the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to satisfy each and every ele-
ment of the tort alleged. As attorneys litigating cases in the area of 
law and medicine are aware, the issues that arise concerning medical-
legal causation are both intriguing and complex. Because of the com-
plexity of many injuries, a plaintiff, although able to produce evidence 
and expert opinion demonstrating that a physician's conduct clearly fell 
below acceptable standards, may nevertheless be required to undertake 
additional discovery 16 to obtain expert evaluation to present competent 
10 ld. at 2796, 382 N.E.2d at 1040. C.L. 231, § 6OB, empowers a screening 
panel to review "[e]very action for malpractice, error or mistake against a provider 
of health care." For furthe.r discussion of this aspect of Little, see § 12.6 supra. 
11 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2798, 382 N.E.2d 1041. 
12 C.L. c. 231, § 6OB. 
13 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2798, 382 N.E.2d at 1041. 
14 ld. at 2799, 382 N.E.2d at 1041. 
15 ld. 
16 Such discovery may only be available upon depoSition or subpoena after com-
pletion of the tribunal frocess. Since the statute requires that the tribunal con-
vene within 15 days 0 the defendant's answer to the complaint, a plaintiff is 
foreclosed from taking advantage of interrogatories, depositions, or notices to produce 
prior to m~eting his burden before the tribunal. C.L. c. 231, § OOB. See also 
McLaughlin, Malpractice Tribunal System, 3 AM. J.L. MED. 203, 204 (1977). 
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evidence of causation. It may be, however, that the COUrt was merely 
considering the "process" of evaluation applied to a motion for a di-
rected verdict, without intending to require that eaoh element of the 
prima facie case must be satisfied,17 This process could include the 
assumption that all allegations of fact and opinion in the plaintiff's case 
are assumed to be true and are to be reviewed in the manner most 
favorable to the plaintiff. Unlike the analysis employed for a rule 
12( b)( 6) motion, the tribunal would not be required to assume that 
the plaintiff can produce a set of facts to support the general allegation 
that there is a legitimate issue appropriate for judicia'l inquiry, unless 
the allegation is supported by plaintiff's offer of proof to the tribunal. 
Under such circumstances, it cannot always reasonably be held that a 
complaint for malpractice is frivolous or that it does not raise a question 
appropriate for judicial inquiry.18 Thus, while the Little decision on 
its face purports to settle the question of the standard of review to be 
applied by a medical malpractice tribunal, the practical application of 
this standard must await future decisions. 
After deciding Little, the Supreme Judicial Court again considered the 
issue of what actions are reviewable by a medical malpractice tribunal. 
In Salem Orthopedic Surgeons, Inc. v. Quinn,19 the defendant, in response 
to an action brought by a phYSician to recover amounts due on unpaid 
medical bills,20 counterclaimed that the physician had breached a prom-
ise to produce a speciHc medical result. 21 When Salem Orthopedic 
moved for an order to refer the case to a medical malpractice screening 
tribunal, the judge dooied the motiOn.22 . The Supreme Judicial Court 
granted direct appellate review to consider whether section 60B of 
chapter 231 applied to the defendant's counterclaim.23 
On appeal, the Court ruled that actions alleging a breach of a physi-
cian's promise to produce a speCific medical result should be referred 
117 Until further interpretation is prOvided, however, plaintiff's counsel would be 
wise not to file a complaint until counsel has prepared a tribunal packet which 
would survive a motion for a directed finding on each element of the tort alleged. 
18 In raising this issue one is forced to consider whether everything intended to 
be accom~lished by the tribunal process could not have been better accomplished 
by a judicious use of motions for summary judgment by defense counsel for those 
claims which were patently frivolous, or could not be supported by affidavit. The 
statutory mandate clearly could be interpreted as an implicit censure of the mal-
practice defense bar for failure to effectively use this device. 
19 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 661, 386 N.E.2d 1268. 
20 ld. at 661, 386 N.E.2d at 1269. 
21 ld. at 662, 386 N.E.2d at 1269. The defendant claimed that the physician 
had promised to strengthen and lengthen his daughter's leg, which had been seri-
ously injured in a car accident. ld. at 663, 386 N.E.2d at 1270. 
22 ld. at 662, 386 N.E.2d at 1269. 
23 ld. 
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to a malpractice tribunal.24 The Court assumed that the defendant's 
counterclaim was based upon Sullivan v. O'Connor,25 where the Court 
had allowed recovery against a physician who had failed, without fault, 
to produce an expressly agreed-upon medical result. The Court con-
ceded that in an action for breach of promise the issue of whether the 
physician conformed to the appropriate professional standard is irrele-
vant, because fault is not an element of the claim.26 Thus, the action 
is not treatment-related in the sense of Little v. Rosenthal.27 The Court 
observed, however, that because the existence or nonexistence of an 
express promise is usually a question of fact, a trial judge may not be 
able to separate a contract claim from a tort claim until a late stage in 
the judicial proceedings.2H It noted that a frivolous action alleging 
breach of contract could have as much nuisance value as a frivolous 
tort claim. 211 The Court also remarked that since a doctor would seldom 
in good faith promise a specific medical result, most allegations of breach 
of contract would in fact prove to be allegations of negligence.30 For 
these reasons, the Court concluded that the defendant's counterclaim 
for failure to produoe a guaranteed medical result was subject to the 
statute and should initially be screened by a malpractice tribunaPl 
After concluding that a medical breach of contract claim should be 
reviewed by a malpractice panel, the Court considered what precise 
24 Id. 
25 363 Mass. 597, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973). 
26 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 667,386 N.E.2d at 1271. In Clevenger v. Haling, 1979 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2400, 394 N.E.2d 1119, the Court, in upholding Sullivan v. O'Connor, 
363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973), defined the "clear proof" necessary to 
support an action for breach of contract to provide a particular medical result: 
"Clear proof" does not require proof of special consideration for the promise 
nor does it heighten the burden of proof. What it does require is that the 
trier of fact give. attention to particular facts in deciding whether the physician 
made a statement which, in the context of the relationship, could have been 
reasonably interpreted by the patient as a promise that a given result or cure 
would be achieved. The factors relevant in such an appraisal and their respec-
tive values or weights will vary with the circumstances of given cases. Some 
of the possible factors are noted in the Sullivan case. It should be regarded 
as a negative factor, although one not in itself determinative, that the physician 
and patient did not focus on the. question whether the physician was under-
taking to achieve a given result. 
[d. at 2406-07, 394 N.E.2d at 1122. 
27 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2793, 382 N.E.2d 1037. See text at notes 4-17 supra. 
28 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 668, 386 N.E.2d at 1272. 
2!1 [d. The Court had previously observed that the legislative purpose behind 
the malpractice tribunal statute was to discourage "frivolous claims whose defense 
would tend to inorease premiums charged for medical malpractice insurance." 
Austin v. Boston Univ. Hasp., 372 Mass. 654, 655 n.4, 363 N.E.2d 515, 516 n.4 
(1977). 
30 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 669, 386 N.E.2d at 1272. 
31 Id. at 662, 386 N.E.2d at 1269. 
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issues should properly be before the pane},32 Reviewing the require-
ments of section 6OB, the Court determined that the panel should evalu-
ate only the medical aspects of the claim.33 Thus, the Court ruled that 
the factual issue of whether the parties made an agreement as alleged 
in the complaint was not before the tribunal,34 The appropriate ques-
tion for the tribunal, the Court concluded, was whether the plaintiffs 
offer of proof was sufficient to raise a legitimate question of whether 
the medical result obtained was consistent with the medical result al-
legedly promised by the health care provider.35 
In reaching its decision, the Court did not comment on the form re-
quired for the offer of proof. It is unclear whether factual allegations 
must be supported by affidavit or whether they can be submitted as 
statements by counsel. In the absence of a ruling to the contrary, the 
latter should be sufficient. In order to avoid subsequent allegations of 
unethical conduct, however, counsel would be well-advised to submit 
supporting affidavits. 
The Supreme Judicial Court decision in Salem Orthopedic Surgeons 
required a malpractice screening tribunal constituted pursuant to section 
60B to confine its review of a malpractice claim to the medical aspects 
of the claim.36 This decision was reinforced in another Survey year 
decision concerning the limits of tribunal jurisdiction. In McMahon v. 
Glixman,37 the plaintiff's claim of medical malpractice was rejected on 
the ground that the evidence presented was insufficient to raise a legiti-
mate question of liability. 38 The plaintiff appealed, contending, inter 
alia, that the malpractice tribunal had erroneously admitted evidence 
in the question of whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute 
of limitations.39 
The Supreme Judicial Court, transferring the case in its own motion, 
agreed with the plaintiff. The Court observed that about one-half of 
the transcript of the hearing before the tribunal was devoted to testi-
mony or argument on this issue.4o The tribunal's decision, however, 
32 ld. at 669-70, 386 N.E.2d at 1272. 
33 ld. at 670, 386 N.E.2d at 1272. 
34 ld. 
35 ld. 
36 ld. at 669-70, 386 N.E.2d at 1272. 
37 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2277, 393 N.E.2d 875. 
38 ld. at 2277, 393 N.E.2d at 876. 
39 ld. at 2285, 393 N.E.2d at 879. C.L. c. 260, § 4, establishes a three-year 
statute of limitations for malpractice actions against certain defendants. One of the 
major points of contention between the plaintiff and the defendant was the date 
of the plaintiff's last consultation with the defendant. If the defendant's evidence 
had been accepted, the action would have been barred by the statute of limitations. 
ld. 
40 ld. at 2285-86, 393 N.E.2d at 879. 
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made no reference to the statute of limitations and gave no indication 
of whether evidence presented on that issue influenced its decision in 
favor of the defendant.41 The Court nevertheless held that the tribunal 
was in error either to receive or to consider evidence on the issue of 
the statute of limitations.42 Citing Salem Orthopedic Surgeons, Inc. v. 
Quinn,43 the Court emphasized that the tribunal's role should be con-
fined to examining evidence relevant to allegations of medical malprac-
tice.44 Acknowledging that allowing the tribunal to examine both medi-
cal and nonmedical issues would expedite the legislative purpose of dis-
couraging frivolous claims, the Court declined to "tum the tribunal 
process into a miniature trial in all issues." 45 Hence, the Court reiterated 
its view expressed in Salem Orthopedic Surgeons that the tribunal's re-
view process be confined to medical issues. 
§14.11. Legislation-Ski Operators-Responsibility and Liability. In 
the 1978 decision of Sunday v. Stratton Corp.,! the Vermont Supreme 
Court upheld a l.5 million dollar verdict won by a plaintiff who had 
been seriously injured while skiing on a novice trail at a Vermont ski 
resort.2 The defendant had claimed as its principal defense that as-
sumption of the risk by the plaintiff was a complete bar to recovery. 
The Court rejected this defense on the basis that Vermont's enactment 
of a comparative negligence statute 3 had abolished the assumption of 
the risk doctrine as a complete defense and retained it simply as one 
element of contributory negligence.4 Following the Sunday decision, 
the Massachusetts ski industry mobilized, and, on the ground that in-
surance rates would be prohibitive,5 obtained passage of the Massachu-
setts Ski Act. 6 
The new Massachusetts Ski Act amended the 1968 Recreational Tram-
way Act,7 which was enacted to establish rules and regulations for the 
41 Id. at 2286-87, 393 N.E.2d at 879. 
42 Id. at 2287, 393 N.E.2d at 879. 
43 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 661, 386 N.E.2d 1268. 
44 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2289, 393 N.E.2d at 880. 
45 Id. at 2288, 393 N.E.2d at 880. 
§14.1l. 1 136 Vt. 293, 390 A.2d 398 (1978). 
2 Id. at 310, 390 A.2d at 407. 
3 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1306. 
4 136 Vt. at 297, 390 A.2d at 400-01. In other words, in measuring the degree 
to which the plaintiff's conduct contributed to the injury, one factor should be the 
plaintiff's assumption of the risk of participating in an inherently dangerous sport. 
The assumption of such risk would not defeat recovery altogether unless it could 
be shown that the plaintiff's conduct as a whole contributed more than 50 percent 
to the injury as compared with the conduct of the defendant. See VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 12, § 1036. 
5 See Note, Ski Operators and Skiers-Responsibility and Liability, 14 N. ENG. 
L. REv. 260, 271 (1978). 
6 C.L. c. 143, §§ 71N-71S, as enacted by Acts of 1978, c. 455, § 4. 
7 Acts of 1968, c. 565. 
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construction, operation, maintenance, inspection, and licensing of ski-
lifts. The act amends tha,t statute by adding provisions to establish 
further duties of ski area operators, responsibilities of skiers, and limita-
tions of actions against ski area operators. The act requires ski area 
operators to mark and identify snow-making equipment "in a manner 
to afford skiers reasonable notice of the proximity of such equipment 
••• "8 and to equip maintenance and emergency vehicles with flashing 
and rotating lights.!! Operators are also charged with the responsibility 
of maintaining and operating "ski areas under [their] control in a rea-
sonably safe condition or manner; provided, however, that ski area 
operators shall not be liable for damages to persons or property, while 
skiing, which arise out of the risks inherent in the sport of skiing." 10 
Skiers in turn are required to follow the instructions of ski lift operators 
and are charged with the general duty to "maintain control of ... speed 
and course at all times, and ... stay clear of any snow-grooming equip-
ment, any vehicle, towers, poles, or other equipment." 11 The act es-
tablishes a presumption that where there is a collision between a skier 
and another skier or a properly marked obstruction, the responsibility 
for the collision lies with that skier and not the ski area operator.12 As 
a condition precedent of bringing an action against the operator of a ski 
area, the plaintiff must within ninety days of the incident give the 
operator notice, by registered mail of the time, place, and cause of the 
injury.13 Failure to give such notice may aot as a bar to recovery.14 
The act further requires that actions must be brought within one year 
of the date of injury.15 
The most significant section of the act is the provision releasing ski 
area operators from liability for injuries arising out of the inherent risks 
of skiing. However broad this release may appear, the scope of this 
provision has yet to be determined. Nevertheless, the addition of this 
provision appears to have reintroduced the affirmative defense of as-
sumption of riskY; A reasonable analysis would indicate little basis for 
providing a complete bar to recovery on account of all risks inherent 
in recreational skiing. 17 If a ski operator's negligence is a proximate 
8 C.L. c. 143, § 71N(l). 
9 [d., § 71N(2). 
10 [d., § 71N( 6). 
11 [d., § 710. 
12 [d. 
13 [d., § 71P. 
14 [d. 
15 [d. 
16 The defense of assu~ption of risk was abolished_ by statute in 1973. See 
C.L. c. 231, § 85, aY amended by Acts of 1973 c. 1123, § 1. 
17 Contra, Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 786 (D. Vt. 1951), 
where a federal court, applying Vermont's assumption of risk doctrine, ruled that 
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cause of the injury, any negligence of the skier properly should be 
considered an element of comparative negligence under the usual prin-
ciples, regardless of its categorization in the statute.IS Thus, a court, in 
construing the statute, should carefully consider whether a risk is "in-
herent" if an injury results from the negligence of the ski-operator.19 
§14.12. Legislation-Abuse by Household Members-Compensatory 
Damages. In two 1976 decisions, Sorensen v. Sorensen 1 and Lewis v. 
Lett.;is,2 the Supreme Judicial Court abolished, with limitations, the doc-
trines of interspousal and parent-child immunity as they applied to ac-
tions for negligence arising from automobile injuries. 3 Until the enact-
ment, during the Survey year, of the Abuse Prevention Act,4 neither the 
courts nor the legislature had addressed the issue of interspousal or 
parent-child immunity as it related to intentional torts.5 
The Abuse Prevention Act permits a family or household member to 
file a complaint in district, superior, or probate court, for abuse com-
mitted by another family or household member.G By its terms abuse 
includes anyone of the following occurrences among family members: 
( a) attempting to cause or causing physical harm; 
( b) placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm; 
( c) causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by 
force, threat of force or duress.7 
A family or household member is defined as a household member, a 
spouse, a former spouse, their minor children, or a blood relative.s The 
any individual who participated in a sport such as skiing, assumes all of the risks 
inherent in the sport, to the extent that they are obvious and necessary. Id. at 791. 
The court had no direct precedent in Vermont and looked to other jurisdictions. 
Thus, its decision was not considered as precedent in Sunday v. Stratton, 136 Vt. 
at 299, 390 A.2d at 401. 
IS C.L. c. 231, § 85. 
III It has been suggested that, the statute should provide a comprehensive set of 
all of the duties to be imposed on the ski operators, so as to bar suit if the explicit 
requirements of due care, and no victim of negligence should be left uncompensated 
for lack of such foresight. See Note, Ski Operators and Skiers-Responsibility and 
Liability, 14 N. ENG. L. REv. 260, 279 (1978). 
§14.12. 1 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1976). 
2 370 Mass. 619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976). 
3 For discussion of these cases, see Smith, Torts, 1976 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW 
§ 5.10, at 120-56. 
4 C.L. c. 209A, as enacted by Acts of 1978, c. 447, § 2. 
5 Actions for such intentional torts have been allowed in many other jurisdic-
tions. See Smith, Torts, 1976 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 5.10, at 124 n.34. Clearly, 
the policy factors of fraud and collusion that have been used to support immunity 
are not applicable to intentional torts. 
6 C.L. c. 209A, as enacted by Acts of 1978, c. 447, § 2. 
7 Id., § 1. 
SId. 
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act provides for a broad range of remedies. Injunctive relief may in-
clude ordering the defendant to refrain from abusing the plaintiff; order-
ing the defendant to vacate the household; awarding temporary custody 
of a minor to one parent; or requiring a defendant who has a legal obli-
gation to support the plaintiff to pay temporary support for such person. U 
The statute also permits monetary compensation for losses suffered as 
a direct result of the abuse.10 These losses may include, but are not 
limited to, loss of earnings or support, out of pocket losses for injuries 
sustained, moving expenses and reasonable attorneys fees.u 
The act was primarily intended to prOvide a speedy and efficient 
method for an abused household member to obtain court and law en-
forcement intervention and protection. Nevertheless, it clearly expresses 
the intent of the legislature to remove any bar, based upon interspousal 
or parent-child immunity, to the recovery of compensatory damages for 
certain intentional torts. The historical justifications for such immunity 
-supporting the family structure and maintaining parental discipline 
and discretion---cease to be persuasive when the family unit has broken 
down to the extent that abuse is occurring.12 
9 Id., § 3. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See Note, Parent-Child Torts, 12 N. ENG. L. REv. 310, 330 (1976). 
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